The Moral Argument
The Moral Argument states:
Every law has a law giver.
There is an absolute moral law.
Therefore, there must be an absolute moral law giver.
The following are 12 considerations concerning the moral law:
- We cannot know what is just unless we know what is unjust
- Absolutes are undeniable since we affirm absolutes when we try to deny them
- Moral comparisons demand an objective moral law
- True progress or regress demands an absolute standard
- Everything cannot be relative. Relative cannot be compared to relative
- Moral disputes call for an objective standard outside the dispute
- We don’t invent the moral law; we discover the moral law (like the discovery of gravity)
- Universal moral guilt shows an absolute moral law
- The fact that we sometimes choose duty over instinct shows there must be an absolute standard
- All cultures find some things evil, such as genocide, racism, and bigotry. Therefore, there must be a universal standard.
- Many of the things we don’t want others to do to us imply an absolute standard
- The same basic moral code is found in all cultures.
- It is merely herd instinct.
- First, it is not true. If so, the stronger instinct would always win, but it does not since moral duty sometimes outweighs the weaker one.
- Second, were it true, we would always act from instinct, not override it, as we sometimes do.
- Moral law is a social convention.
- First, what is learned through society (e.g. math and logic) is not necessarily based on society.
- Second, judgments about society being better or worse only makes sense if they are independent of society.
- Third, most differences in judgment are over facts, not values. (that is, the same principles applied in different situations might lead to different actions but still uphold the same values.)
- Moral law is just the law of nature.
- First, nature’s laws are descriptive, not prescriptive (as the moral law is).
- Second, situations that are more inconvenient are sometimes morally desirable and vice versa.
- Third, things naturally more convenient are sometimes condemned by moral duty (e.g.. betraying one’s friend for money)
- Fourth, even factual convenience for the whole race does not explain why I ought to do something when it is not factually convenient for me to do so.
- The Moral law is mere fancy.
- First, it can’t be because we can’t get rid of it.
- Second, value judgments are meaningless without it.
- Third, I did not make it, since it condemns me.
- People interpret the moral law differently.
- Scientist have interpreted nature differently, but natural laws have not changed.
- We used to burn witches but no longer do. So, values change.
- Our values did not change. We still believe in punishing murderers. What changed was our factual understanding of whether witches are murderers.
- Practices vary from culture to culture.
- Moral law is not what people do but what they ought to do. We know this by what we want people to do to us (not by what we do to them)
- Even our understanding of virtue differs from culture to culture.
- My understanding of love has changed over time but love has not changed.
- Political debates reveal a conflict of values.
- These are largely debates over means, not ends (values)
- The abortion debate is a conflict of values.
- Much of it concerns the fact (of when human life begins), not the value of life (or persons). The conflict of values can be resolved by appealing to expectations, not actions.